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East is East, and West is West? Currency iconography as nation-branding in the wider Europe

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A B S T R A C T

This article considers European banknote iconography as an indicator of national branding choices from the early twentieth century up to the present. Systematic quantitative content analysis demonstrates that the values and ontologies expressed on Central/East European banknotes have historically tracked closely with the trends visible on their West European counterparts. This pattern is evident not just since the end of the Cold War, but indeed right from the founding of the modern Central/East European states about a century ago. Even during the Cold War, it did not take long for the trends on Western banknotes to appear on Central/East European banknotes as well. Thus, contrary to the conventional assumption of a deep-rooted normative gulf separating the national identity discourses of so-called “New” and “Old” Europe, the article underscores the fact of intense, longstanding normative cross-pollination between them.

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Introduction: the values of banknotes

Cash money is not only a medium of exchange and a store of value; it is also a vehicle of state propaganda. Since the late 19th century, modern states have systematically exploited their control of the money supply to assert the naturalness, stability, and felicity of the equation between the nation, the state, and the legal tender (see, e.g., Billig, 1995; Cohen, 1998; Gilbert, 1998, 2007, 2008; Gilbert & Helleiner, 1999; Helleiner, 1998, 2003; Hewitt, 1994, 1995; McNamara, 2004; Raento, Hämäläinen, Ikonen, & Mikkonen, 2004). But what specific messages have states deployed on their money to make this equation? In other words, what values and ontologies have they symbolically embraced in the effort to promote a national “brand” (Dinnie, 2008; Kotler & Gertner, 2002) that will be positively evaluated by their domestic and international audiences?

It is often assumed that, just as the face of the emperor once graced the coins of the Roman Empire, so too are portraits of current or former heads of state the natural choice for modern national currencies. The state surely likes to glorify itself: consider the presence of so many dead presidents on the US greenback (Lauer, 2008), and of so many live ones on the money of developing world dictatorships (Galloy, 2000; Fuller, 2008; Tappe, 2007). However, in an ever-changing world, states that simply boast of their power risk offending the reigning values and ontologies of the day—and may ultimately pay a stiff price in terms of popular and international legitimacy (Franck, 1990). Indeed, the need for legitimacy is particularly great in the case of national fiat money, whose functional value is utterly dependent on its ability to command high levels of trust (Hall, 2008). Thus, by the early 1990s the modal West European banknote featured not a king or president, but instead a famous artist, musician or scholar (Hymans, 2004, 2006). Even the stodgy Bank of England today circulates notes that feature not just the reigning Queen, but also the scientist Charles Darwin (10 pounds), the composer Edward Elgar (20 pounds), and the philosopher Adam Smith (also 20 pounds), as well as other non-politicians. These images offer a very different picture of the country than the stern visage of Britannia, the classically robed female personification of the state that dominated all English banknotes up to the mid-20th century. These iconographic trends are not limited to Europe; the Japanese yen has also undergone a similar transformation (Hymans, 2005). Indeed, among the currencies of highly developed countries only the American dollar has maintained a monotonous iconographic focus on the country’s greatest political leaders.

Not only has national banknote iconography tended to change over time; iconographic changes have also tended to diffuse across space. The banknote iconographies of West European states (or to be more precise, the first 15 members of the European Union) offer a striking historical pattern of temporal discontinuity combined with geographical continuity: at least at the level of basic values and ontologies, West European banknotes have seen considerable iconographic change over time, but also marked iconographic similarity at any one point in time (Hymans, 2004). Over the course of the 20th
That West European banknotes, as important sites for the expression and dissemination of national identity discourse, should display such a pattern of change over time and similarity across space is surprising for various social scientific theories, not to mention for the popular belief that different nations’ identities are highly unique and persistent across the centuries. Moreover, other West European state-produced cultural products, such as postage stamps, appear to display similar iconographic trends (Cusack, 2005; Jones, 2001; Raento, 2006, 2009; Raento & Brunn, 2005, 2008).

In earlier publications (Hyman, 2004, 2005, 2006) I argued that this pattern can be understood in light of two major social science theories of cultural change: the updated modernization theory of the political scientist Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), and the world society norms theory of the sociologist John W. Meyer and his colleagues (Krücken, 2008; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997). Both of these theories describe similar historical trends in West European values and ontologies—trends that those who seek to build or maintain a positive national brand defy at their peril. First, both theories contend that perceptions of who or what are the main actors in history have shifted, from the early 20th century focus on the state, to the mid-20th century focus on society, and then to the late 20th century focus on the individual (see esp. Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: 30; Meyer & Jepperson, 2000). Second, both theories contend that perceptions of the true meaning or goal of life have also shifted, from the early 20th century focus on faith and tradition, to the mid-20th century quest for material success, and then to the late 20th century postmaterialist or even post-modern focus on following your bliss.

But although Inglehart and Meyer’s theories describe similar changes in West European values and ontologies over time, they point to very different social processes as the basic sources of those changes. Therefore, although their theories’ expectations converge for the highly developed countries of Western Europe—as well as other highly developed countries, such as Australia, Canada, or Japan—they diverge with respect to others, for instance the post-Communist, new member-states of the European Union (EU) in Central/East Europe. These divergent theoretical expectations for the Central/East European states have important political implications, since those states are now engaged with their West European counterparts in a long-term integration project that is widely believed to rest fundamentally on the ability of the people inside the geographical boundaries of the newly enlarged EU to also see themselves as inhabiting the same cultural community (Amin, 2004). There is thus great potential value in undertaking a comparative historical study of the currency iconography of the “wider Europe,” as the space of the enlarged EU stretching from Portugal to Poland is often called (Baun, 2000). In addition, testing Meyer and Inglehart’s theories against each other in the European context can also provide more general insight into the extent and sources of international isomorphism in collective mentalities—a project with global implications (Braudel, 1999 [1963]).

Inglehart and Meyer’s theoretical expectations clash in the Central/East European case because they disagree over whether cultural shifts are mostly driven from the bottom up or the top down. The main driver behind cultural change in Inglehart’s updated modernization theory is bottom-up: as people start to feel more secure from violence and hunger, gain more education, and so on, they naturally begin to feel more empowered and to place a higher value on individual self-expression (Maslow, 1954). The results of Inglehart’s World Values Survey indeed suggest that Central/East Europe is following Western Europe in this evolutionary process, but still lags behind (Inglehart, 2004).

Extending Inglehart’s modernization theory to banknote iconography—in other words, hypothesizing that states use their banknotes to send value and ontology messages that are likely to be appreciated by the proverbial “man in the street”—the observable implication would be that Central/East European banknote iconography should have followed West European models over the past century, but with a considerable time lag. Indeed, given the great economic difficulties faced by much of Central/East Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall, an Inglehart-inspired hypothesis might even expect a retreat in recent years toward more traditionalist symbolism.

Meyer’s world society theory, by contrast, depicts the main driver behind cultural change as states’ desire for legitimacy and recognition as normal members of the society of states. World society theory can be read as starting from the observation that although the states system is loosely hierarchical, it contains no single overarching power able to dictate a standard set of behaviors and beliefs. Paradoxically, it is this very lack of central direction that causes states to become highly sensitive about adopting practices that may isolate them from the majority and call their “normal” status into question (Meyer, 1994). The reigning uncertainty leads states to develop a herd mentality that can transform initially modest proposals made by other states, intergovernmental or even non-governmental organizations into hegemonic international norms. Although in reality few states follow all world society norms, and some states follow few of them, nevertheless scholars animated by the world society norms perspective have discovered a remarkable degree of international isomorphism across a most diverse array of topics. Much of this isomorphism cannot be explained by reference to the levels of economic development that modernization theorists like Inglehart believe are so determining (Meyer et al., 1997).

Extending Meyer’s world society norms perspective to banknote iconography—in other words, hypothesizing that states use their banknotes to advertise their adherence to the values and ontologies currently fashionable among their peers—the observable implication would be that the currency iconography of Central/East Europe should have kept pace with changes in West European models over the past century. In short, contrary to Inglehart, Meyer would not expect there to be a major time lag between a new iconographic norm’s appearance in the West and its appearance in the Central/East. A Meyer world society norms hypothesis would not even expect the political fissure that split the European continent in half after World War II to have broken the magnetic effect of West European models for their Central/Eastern brethren (Adams, 2008).

It is also possible that both of these perspectives could be a poor fit for Central/East European banknotes. Indeed, there is a long tradition of scholarship, and most famously the classic work of Hans Kohn (1967), that sees profound, historically rooted differences between Western “civic” and Eastern “ethnic” national identities. In fact Inglehart himself has gradually warmed up to this general point of view and in recent work has attempted to complement his modernization theory with a traditional culturalist framework rooted in different regions’ distinct religious heritages (Inglehart, 2004; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). However, most contemporary scholars of nationalism reject Kohn’s assertions of a deeply historically rooted, stark dichotomy between the national identity discourses of West and Central/East Europeans (Calhoun, 2007). Although the dichotomy between “East” and “West” may have seemed natural to many Westerners during the Cold War years, people from places like Bratislava or Budapest have long rejected these categories and instead propounded the geographical notion of “Central” Europe (Hagen, 2003). Indeed, as Janos (1982, 2000) has...
emphasized, for at least a century the central political objective of the Central/East European states has been to reduce the psychologically painful development gap that separates them from a Western Europe that they perceive as being geographically and culturally proximate. It would be surprising if this basic feeling of belonging did not seep into iconographic choices related to national branding; but still, this is a question to be answered by empirical analysis.

In this article, I evaluate the merits of the Meyer, Inglehart, and Kohn-inspired competing hypotheses through a quantitative content analysis of the human images that the 10 new Central/East European member-states of the EU have chosen to place on their national paper money since the early 20th century, in comparison with the images placed on the national banknotes of the first 15 EU member-states during that same time span. My basic finding is that Central/East European banknotes have in fact closely mirrored the shifting iconographic statements made by Western national currencies. This pattern started not just in 1989, but right from the birth of the modern Central/East European states about a century ago. The pan-European isomorphism of banknote iconography was only briefly interrupted during the first half of the Cold War. The isomorphism revealed by this study indicates the power of world society norms for shaping expressions of national identity.

Such a finding is consequential on various levels. First, from a comparative politics perspective, the finding negates the common assumption of the primat der Innenpolitik in the construction of national identity—the notion that national identity discourses are drawn essentially from domestic sources and targeted at domestic audiences. Second, from an international relations theory perspective, the finding negates the common assumption of the international system as an unchanging culture of anarchy, instead showing that states’ political conceptions and choices have long been strongly influenced by transnational cultural trends. And third, from a geographical perspective, the finding negates the common assumption that there are fundamental differences in outlook between so-called “New” Europe in the East and “Old” or “Core” Europe in the West. Such a finding is consequential on various levels. First, from a comparative politics perspective, the finding negates the common assumption of the primat der Innenpolitik in the construction of national identity—the notion that national identity discourses are drawn essentially from domestic sources and targeted at domestic audiences. Second, from an international relations theory perspective, the finding negates the common assumption of the international system as an unchanging culture of anarchy, instead showing that states’ political conceptions and choices have long been strongly influenced by transnational cultural trends.

The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section describes the process of constructing the Central/East European banknote iconography database. The section after that presents results from a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of those banknotes, focusing especially on the comparison with West European (EU 15) banknotes. A further section describes the range of iconographic variation within the Central/East European group since the end of the Cold War. The final section concludes by amplifying the article’s discussion of the question of what and where is “Europe.”

A database of Central/East European banknotes

The value of a systematic study of Central/East European banknote iconography has been previously recognized. Unwin and Hewitt’s (2001, 2004) pathbreaking work investigated the banknotes in circulation at the end of the 1990s in 17 post-Communist countries in Central/East Europe. On the basis of a large database that they created, Unwin and Hewitt found that the notes were dominated by portraits of historically significant individuals who were overwhelmingly male, who mostly hailed from the 19th century, and whose main contributions were in the fields of politics or literature. Unwin and Hewitt also implied that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Central/East European banknotes had reverted to traditional expressions of national identity—a point that, if correct, would represent a stark contrast with the evolution of their Western counterparts (Unwin & Hewitt, 2001: 1020). This interpretation was in line with some broader analyses of the trends in Central/East European nationalisms at that time (e.g., Brubaker, 1996), as well as with the theoretical expectations of the Inglehart perspective. But it was hard to verify the idea of a traditionalist trend, since Unwin and Hewitt’s database was restricted to a snapshot view of banknotes in use at the end of the 1990s. Moreover, Unwin and Hewitt offered only an implicit comparison with Western banknote models. To answer the question being posed in this article, it is necessary to adopt a broader geographic and temporal focus than Unwin and Hewitt. In other words, it is necessary to systematically compare the evolution of Western versus Central/East European banknote iconography over the long run.

A note on methodology

I apply a methodology for the quantitative content analysis of banknotes that was first introduced in Hymans (2004). Human figures appearing on banknotes are coded along a two-dimensional typology of core values and ontologies that reflects the cultural shift theories of both Meyer and Inglehart. The great advantage of this operationalization of the theories is that it facilitates the systematic comparison of the evolution of many different countries’ currency iconographies across time.

As indicated by Table 1, the first dimension of the typology is the perceived locus of social action/hood: i.e., are the main motive forces of history states, or mass societies/social classes, or individuals? The second dimension of the typology is the perceived principal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Materialist</th>
<th>Postmaterialist (eventually Post-modern)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Classical/antique imagery used to represent states, classical gods, ornamental figures (e.g., ‘Columbia’, Athena, classically beautiful human form)</td>
<td>Historical heads of state, other statesmen, soldiers (e.g., George Washington, Douglas Macarthur, US Army GI)</td>
<td>Producers of “official culture” (e.g., Francis Scott Key, Edward Teller, US Marine Band)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society/Classes</td>
<td>Classical/antique imagery of mass, class, sector, or region representatives (e.g., toga-clad allegory of ‘Commerce’, ‘Old Man of the Mountain’)</td>
<td>Imagery of real-world mass, class, sector, or region representatives at work (e.g., farmers in the fields)</td>
<td>Imagery of real-world mass, class, sector, or region representatives at play (e.g., a local square dance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Historical non-state actors from classical/antique era, or examples of individual-level virtues including religiosity (e.g., Aristotle, Saint Elizabeth Seton)</td>
<td>Historical non-state actors who made significant economic or social contributions (e.g., Henry Ford, Thomas Edison, Susan B. Anthony)</td>
<td>Historical non-state actors who made significant cultural incl. scientific contributions (e.g., Man Ray, Elvis Presley, Albert Einstein)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Examples of iconographic choices.
goal of life—i.e., is it to honor eternal truths (traditionalist), or to gain security and welfare (materialist), or to pursue personal self-expression (postmaterialist/post-modern)? Table 1 indicates the kinds of iconographic choices that would likely reflect different answers to the two questions, using examples from American culture. The use of American examples here is purely heuristic and should not be taken to suggest that the US drives global cultural change. Indeed, the US very often deviates from world society norms (Lechner & Boli, 2005).

In addition to human figures, banknotes normally also feature other pictorial elements, such as animals and landscapes, that may be equally pregnant with symbolic meaning yet are ignored by the operationalization of the theories outlined in Table 1. This is a shame; but the real question is, does ignoring those other pictorial elements create a seriously warped vision of the iconographic messages being sent by the notes? There are strong reasons to believe that it does not, at least not for most of the cases under examination here. First, historically most European banknotes have featured human figures as their dominant, central images. Unwin and Hewitt (2001, 2004) also stress the dominance of human figures in their study of contemporary Central/East European banknotes. Second, in addition to the objectively large size of many of the human figures depicted, there is a natural human psychological tendency to lock on to images of fellow humans, however prominent or hidden they may be. This psychological tendency is well-known to European banknote designers, for whom a principal goal is to render their product instantly recognizable to millions of consumers (de Heij, 2007). (Note that in the database constructed for this article, no distinction was made between large and small human figures.) Third, in general the coding of human figures can serve as an excellent proxy for the overall symbolic message of the note, since the other design elements tend to reinforce that message. After all, most banknote designs are not like a Da Vinci painting, with many layers of meaning and subtlety to be explored. For instance, take the Belgian 200 franc note that circulated up until 2002. Its front side featured a large portrait of the musician and inventor Adolphe Sax on the left, a closeup of saxophone keys toward the bottom, musical notes toward the top, and a whole saxophone on the right. Meanwhile, on its back side there was a large image of saxophone players in concert on the left, and a saxophone on the right. Staples et al. (2004) also stress the dominance of human figures on their study of contemporary Central/East European banknotes.

For instance, take the Belgian 200 franc note that circulated up until 2002. Its front side featured a large portrait of the musician and inventor Adolphe Sax on the left, a closeup of saxophone keys toward the bottom, musical notes toward the top, and a whole saxophone on the right. Meanwhile, on its back side there was a large image of saxophone players in concert on the left, and a saxophone on the right. Perhaps more problematic for the methodology employed here is that even the top-line meaning of certain historical figures’ activities can be reinterpreted in light of changed values. For instance, Swedish history schoolbooks, which once portrayed the Vikings as fearsome warriors, now portray them as long-distance traders who enjoyed interacting with people from foreign cultures (Soysal, 2002). To pick up such a change in nuance would require in-depth qualitative analysis. In short, the quantitative content analysis methodology contains a bias toward a finding of iconographic stasis; but this means that if even this biased measure reports iconographic change, that finding should be taken all the more seriously.

Constructing the database

Two research assistants and I constructed a new database of Central/East European banknote iconography that lists the human figures found on all regular, mass-produced banknotes of the 10 recent post-Communist entrants to the EU, starting from the founding of their national central banks generally about a century ago and going up to September 2009. The 10 countries covered are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (plus defunct Czechoslovakia), Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia. The other two recent EU entrants, Malta and Cyprus, have histories that are quite divergent from those of the other 10, so they are not included in the present article.

In constructing the database we relied heavily on the Standard Catalog of World Paper Money (Cuhaj, 2007; Shafer & Bruce, 2000), a numismatic publication. For the most recent notes, we relied on the websites of the national central banks. Table 2 provides a country-by-country summary of the banknotes and of the number of human figures found on them. Note that if there are multiple unnamed figures engaged in the same activity, they are listed together as one figure (e.g., “peasants working in the fields”). In addition, if unnamed figures surround a named figure, they are not listed (e.g., an image of Mozart playing in front of an audience would simply result in a listing for Mozart).

The 721 human figures described in the right hand column of Table 2 form the basic “N” of the subsequent analysis. In the Central/East European cases the great majority (87%) of the banknotes feature human figures. This is almost exactly the same as the 86% score registered by the first EU 15 (Hymans, 2004). Why do some notes not have human figures? It is difficult to say with certainty, but in most cases these omissions came when states found themselves in extreme circumstances. Indeed 53 of 80, or 66% of the unpeopled banknotes in this data set are from just a handful of very turbulent years in Central and Eastern Europe: 1916–1920, 1943–1948, or 1989–1992. On the other hand, it should

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (currency)</th>
<th>First issue date</th>
<th>Latest issue date</th>
<th># of banknotes</th>
<th># with human figures</th>
<th>Total # human figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (lev)</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>73 (70%)</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia (krona)</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25 (96%)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic (koruna)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26 (100%)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia (kroon)</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26 (96%)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary (korona, to pengo, to forint)</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>92 (100%)</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia (lats, briefly rublis)</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11 (34%)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania (litas, briefly talonas)</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67 (97%)</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (zloto)</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>67 (87%)</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (leu)</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>98 (96%)</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia (korun)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22 (100%)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia (tolarjev)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32 (76%)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>539 (87%)</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
be signaled that, unique among the countries examined here, post-
Soviet Latvia has made a sustained political choice to avoid
depicting human figures, opting instead mostly for natural and
pastoral scenes. As shown in Table 2, only 11 of Latvia’s 32 bank-
notes (34%) feature human figures. Moreover, only 3 of 22 (14%) of
its post-Soviet era banknotes do. The Latvian case indicates a limi-
tation in the current operationalization of the theories.

Note that in order to be counted as a “new” banknote by the
numismatists, only a relatively slight alteration is necessary. Thus
many of the human figures in the database are the same as the
figures on the previous banknote at the same denomination.
Nonetheless, out of the 721 images of human figures in the data-
base, 366 or 51% of these were not depicted on the previous note at
the same denomination. This is just a bit lower than the 59% score
registered for the first EU 15, and it is far greater than the US dollar,
for instance. Thus, significant changes in Central/East European
banknote iconography are not only possible, but in fact are normal.
The 721 human figures on the banknotes include both unnamed
individuals and named individuals. Biographical information on the
named individuals was sought from standard sources—in almost
all cases, either or both the Internationale Biographischer Index and
the Encyclopedia Britannica. Descriptions of unnamed individuals
were also recorded on the basis of information provided in the
Standard Catalog.

A research assistant and I separately coded all of the human
figures in the database along the two axes shown in Table 1,
according to the same rules that were applied in Hymans (2004,
2005). The level of coding agreement was 95%, a very high figure
for intercoder reliability (Neuendorf, 2002).

The historical evolution of Central/East European banknotes

What banknote iconography choices have Central/East Euro-
pean states made over the years? How do those choices compare
with those made by West European states? This section answers
these questions by presenting the overall results of the content
analyses for these two groups of states. The basic story told by this
data is that the modal values and ontologies projected by both
Central/East and West European banknote iconographies have
changed markedly over the years, in the same direction, and to
roughly the same extent. This finding provides strong support for
the Meyer world society norms perspective.

Quantitative patterns

Table 3 shows coding results for the banknotes of the Central/
East European states along the vertical axis of Table 1, “locus of
actorhood”: state, society, or non-state individual. The periodiza-
tion of the table reflects major historical turning points that might
be expected to have had an impact on the values and ontologies
that attach to national identities: the end of World Wars I and II, the

As Table 3 shows, up to 1968 Central/East European banknotes
overwhelmingly featured representations of state or society, while
featuring very few non-state individuals. Interestingly, the change-
over to Communism actually produced only moderate movement in
the direction of depicting societal actors rather than state ones. But
around 1968, representations of society began to plummet in favor
of non-state individuals. And since 1990, non-state individuals
actually represent the majority of the human figures on the notes. It
is important to underscore that the growing focus on non-state
individuals is not just a post-Communist phenomenon; it has its
origins in the second half of the Communist era.

The next step is to compare these results with the data on the
first EU 15. Overall, the general arc of the iconographic choices in
the two regions is remarkably similar, giving strong support to the
Meyer world society norms perspective. Fig. 1 focuses on the rise
over time of depictions of non-state individuals, which since 1990
have been the modal locus of actorhood depicted on both Western
and Central/Eastern banknotes. Note that since among the Central/
East European states considered here essentially Romania alone
was fully independent during the late 19th and early 20th centu-
ries, legitimate cross-regional comparison can only begin with the
1919–1945 period.

Fig. 1 makes clear the longstanding relationship between the
iconographic preferences of the first EU 15 member-states on the
one hand, and their Central/East European brethren on the other. On
this dimension banknote iconography has been strikingly different
from epoch to epoch, and yet strikingly similar between West and
Central/East Europe in each epoch, with the exception of 1946–1968.
These overall findings lend strong support to the Meyer world
society norms perspective.

Table 4 shows coding results for the banknotes of the Central/
East European states along the horizontal axis of Table 1, “perceived
principal goal of life”: traditionalist, materialist, or postmaterialist.

As Table 4 shows, from World War I up to 1968 Central/East
European banknotes were strongly materialist in orientation. Thus
on this dimension, too, the changeover to Communism did not
greatly affect iconographic choices, at least not at this level of
abstraction. But starting in 1968, materialist figures started giving
way to postmaterialist figures. And since 1990, the main story is the
continued postmaterialist rise, becoming close to the majority of all
figures. Table 4 also reveals a secondary trend of resurgent tradi-
tionalism since 1990. This secondary trend will be examined
carefully in the next section.

The next step is to compare these results with the data on the
first EU 15. Again it is useful to focus on the rise over time of what

Table 3
Changes in the locus of actorhood.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Epoch of currency issue</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Total N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>—1918</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 (45%)</td>
<td>16 (55%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>29 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919–1945</td>
<td>143 (59%)</td>
<td>92 (38%)</td>
<td>8 (3%)</td>
<td>228 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946–1968</td>
<td>48 (42%)</td>
<td>57 (50%)</td>
<td>8 (7%)</td>
<td>123 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969–1989</td>
<td>16 (53%)</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
<td>11 (37%)</td>
<td>30 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–present</td>
<td>138 (45%)</td>
<td>16 (5%)</td>
<td>152 (50%)</td>
<td>306 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>358 (50%)</td>
<td>184 (26%)</td>
<td>179 (25%)</td>
<td>721 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 1. Depictions of non-state individuals as locus of actorhood.
has since 1990 become the modal value on both West and Central/East European banknotes: postmaterialism.

Fig. 2 tells essentially the same story as Fig. 1, indeed even more strikingly. Once again, the combination of iconographic difference across time but similarity across space (with the exception of 1946–1968) strongly supports the Meyer world society norms perspective.

Putting the two axes together further reinforces the Meyer world society norms perspective—i.e., a punctuated equilibrium model of change stimulated by shifts in transnationally legitimate values and ontologies. World society norms do not explain all the variation in the data, but they do offer a powerful explanation for the main pattern.

Qualitative impressions

This section takes a qualitative look at the main themes on Central/East European banknotes in different historical epochs.

Among the Central/East European cases in the database, we have essentially only Romania as a fully independent country for the period from the late 19th century up to World War I. In line with the Meyer world society norms perspective, Romanian banknote iconography was strikingly similar to West European currencies of that epoch. In the West during that time period, the emphasis was strongly on classical or classical-inspired representations of states like “Britannia,” and so on. Romania’s banknotes prior to 1918 also embraced this style, with appearances by Romulus and Remus, a bust of Trajan, the goddess Fortuna, a boy holding a staff of Mercury, and numerous ornamental women and children in classical poses. Some might wonder if Romania is a special case in Central/East Europe because of its Roman heritage and Romance language. But the Meyer world society norms perspective would suggest to the contrary that the Romanian state emphasized the Roman aspects of its history and culture because of the accident of its birth at a time when finding links to ancient Rome was the thing to do (Boia, 2001).

During the 1918–1945 period, both West and Central/East European currencies divided their focus between state-materialist images (e.g., contemporary or historical kings) and societal-materialist images (e.g., peasants working in the fields). In fact, all the Central/East European states offered representations of peasants: men and women, usually hard at work, often in typical national dress. This focus on the peasantry offered a subtle contrast with the greater diversity of economic imagery on West European notes during this period, which featured images of industrial workers and bourgeoisie as well as peasants. But the main point is that in this period, the principal focus across Europe was on materialism. This finding accords with both the Meyer world society norms perspective and the Inglehart modernization perspective.

During the 1946–1968 period, unlike Western banknotes that were already moving strongly toward individual and post-materialist iconography, Central/Eastern banknotes kept the emphasis on state and especially societal-materialist imagery. All five of the surviving states in this period (the Baltics having been incorporated into the USSR) continued to emphasize the hard-working peasant, though now industrial workers and miners also appeared on the notes of Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. That newly installed Communist regimes would focus more attention on workers and on materialist themes is no surprise, but actually it is remarkable how undramatic the iconographic changes were from the pre-Communist era. This is doubly remarkable because the Soviet ruble notes of this period were very different, featuring Lenin as the dominant and indeed practically the only human figure. Among the Central/East European cases studied here, only Bulgaria clearly used its banknotes to further a Lenin-style Communist personality cult. When featuring state-materialist figures, the other currencies tended to focus instead on much earlier national leaders. For instance, Communist Hungary portrayed Lajos Kossuth, who had also appeared on Hungarian money during the 1918–1945 period. The contrast between the strong iconographic changes on West European banknotes during 1946–1968 and the much more subtle changes on Central/East European banknotes during the same period is surprising to the Meyer world society norms perspective. The Inglehart modernization perspective, by contrast, could be said to expect a time lag before the Central/East European states’ rapid industrialization during this period would register on the level of basic values and ontologies. However, in that case the Inglehart perspective could not be said to have expected the 1920s shift by the Central/East Europeans from traditionalism to materialism, nor the 1950s shift by the West Europeans from materialism to postmaterialism. Considerable historical archival research will be necessary to unlock the puzzle of the 1946–1968 period.

Table 4: Changes in the nature of life goals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Epoch of currency issue</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Total N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traditionalist (classical)</td>
<td>Materialist (historical)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919–1945</td>
<td>52 (21%)</td>
<td>185 (76%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946–1968</td>
<td>11 (16%)</td>
<td>89 (79%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969–1989</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>16 (53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–present</td>
<td>39 (13%)</td>
<td>123 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>116 (16%)</td>
<td>429 (60%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 2. Depictions of postmaterialism as life goal.
In the 1969–1989 period Central/East European states moved strongly to rejoin world society norms, now by featuring individual cultural contributors on their banknotes. During this period the Central/East European states issued banknotes featuring composers such as Béla Bartók (Hungary), writers such as Pavol Orszag-Hviezdoslav (Czechoslovakia), and scientists such as Nicolaus Copernicus (Poland). Actually Copernicus was already on the Polish złoty as early as 1962. The individual and postmaterialist trend is also visible on East German banknotes from this same time period, which featured such figures as the poets J. W. von Goethe and Friedrich Schiller (Hymans, 2004). The rise of individual and postmaterialist iconography on Communist era Central/East European banknotes after 1968 is compatible both with the Meyer world society norms perspective and the Inglehart modernization perspective.

The period since 1990 has seen the emergence of essential equivalence between West and Central/East Europe in terms of the levels of individual and postmaterialist iconography. This is strong confirmation of the Meyer world society norms perspective. Since 1990 all ten Central/Eastern states have issued multiple banknotes featuring a modern cultural contributor, and indeed the modal banknote today features such a figure. Table 5 offers an illustrative sampling. I have chosen these examples to indicate not only the number of countries participating in this trend, but also the diverse range of types of cultural contributors they have chosen to honor.

The world society norms of individualism and postmaterialism are extremely well represented on Central/East European banknotes today. Of course, state-materialist imagery has not disappeared. Moreover, since 1990 a number of states including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Romania have also gone in the opposite direction and issued some banknotes featuring traditionalist iconography. The images used include such figures as the muse of Music (Czech Republic), the Virgin Mary (Slovakia), Saint Cyril and Saint Methodius (Bulgaria and Slovakia), and a medieval monk (Hungary). The return of traditionalism, and especially religious symbolism, is thus clearly an important secondary trend in Central/East European banknote iconography. It is notably also visible on their postage stamps (Brunn, 2000). This secondary trend is in line with Inglehart's expectation of a values retreat at times of material stress, as well as with Young and Light's (2001) analysis of post-socialist national democratization of cultural life (Meyer & Jepperson, 2000). The practice of honoring at least one banknote featuring a cultural contributor began in the West starting in the mid-1970s, and in recent years this trend has also appeared strongly on the Central/East European banknotes: six of the ten states' currencies have featured at least one woman writer, singer, painter, or scientist since 1990. The states that have done so are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia. On the other hand, the other four states have so far only featured women in much more old-fashioned roles, such as peasant, mother, or saint. And even among the six more “progressive” cases, none offer anything remotely close to gender parity; but note that few West European national banknote series have offered it either.

**Table 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Profession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Zahari Zagraf</td>
<td>Painter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Emma Destinova</td>
<td>Singer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Rudolf Tobias</td>
<td>Composer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Endre Ady</td>
<td>Poet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Krisjans Baroms</td>
<td>Linguist/folklorist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Stepanas Darius and Stasys Girenas</td>
<td>Aviators/sportsmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Henryk Sienkiewicz</td>
<td>Novelist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Grigore Antipa</td>
<td>Naturalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Anton Bemolak</td>
<td>Linguist/folklorist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Jurii Vega</td>
<td>Mathematician</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The transformation of Central/East European banknote iconography may also be seen via a closer, qualitative consideration of the evolution over time of one single banknote denomination. The Bulgarian lev is a particularly interesting case, because Bulgaria is one of the least economically developed states under consideration here, as well as being in the Orthodox religious/civilizational area. The case of the lev should therefore be quite challenging for the world society norms perspective, but in fact the world society perspective passes this test. The following paragraphs focus specifically on the Bulgarian 50 leva denomination, which well mirrors not only the lev's evolution but also the overall pattern of change on Central/East European banknotes over the course of the century.

The Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) began printing the lev in the late 19th century, when the country was still not formally independent (Tschoegl, 2004). Because national values may not be freely expressed when the state is not fully sovereign, the database starts only with the declaration of independence in 1908. During World War I, the young state issued its first new 50 leva note. It featured only the Bulgarian coat of arms and abstract designs. The next one, issued in 1922, featured a portrait of a typical Bulgarian shepherd (a societal-materialist image). It was printed for the BNB by the American Bank Note Company, a private printing house. Indeed the influence of the US dollar on the 1922 50 leva note is clear: for instance, the dominant color was green, and the font used for the number “50” also reflected the American model (see Fig. 3).
In 1925, a new 50 leva was issued that featured two images of human figures: on the front side, the then-ruler Tsar Boris III (a state-materialist image), and on the back side, a group of woman peasant reapers (a societal-materialist image). This note was printed for the BNB by Bradbury, Wilkinson and Co., an English printer (see Fig. 4).

Tschoegl (2004) entitles his study of the Bulgarian lev “Change the Regime, Change the Money.” Yet in fact one of the most interesting aspects of the 50 leva story is how closely Communist Bulgaria’s 50 leva note resembled its 1925 predecessor. On the front of the note, the late Communist premier Georgi Dimitrov simply took the place of the Tsar (coding: state-materialist). Meanwhile on the back of the note, the new regime used an image of a woman peasant at harvest time, just as the old one had done (coding: societal-materialist). This essential stasis in iconographic vocabulary from the prewar to the Communist period is a striking instantiation of the overall quantitative results discussed in the previous section of the article. The 1951 50 leva note was printed by Goznak, the USSR state printing house (see Fig. 5).

Although I am emphasizing the similarities between the 1925 and 1951 notes, it is also worthwhile to point out the subtle iconographic differences between them. For instance, the earlier note features a wide view of women harvesting, whereas the later note features a portrait of one woman carrying the fruits of her labor. The earlier note thus places greater emphasis on the economic activity, whereas the later note places greater emphasis on the worker. These differences are obviously related to the different ideological predilections of the Bulgarian monarchy and the Communist state. Nonetheless, with more than a half-century of hindsight, it is possible to see the striking underlying similarities that put such differences into perspective.

The 1951 50 leva note lasted until 1990, when a new one without Dimitrov was issued by the dying Communist regime. Then in 1992, newly liberated Bulgaria released a new 50 leva note featuring Hristo Danov, the 19th century “father of Bulgarian printing.” The choice of Danov is coded as individual and materialist, though due to the rather “cultural” nature of his business it could arguably be seen as individual and postmaterialist. Ironically, the note celebrating the father of Bulgarian printing was not printed in Bulgaria, but instead by Giesecke and Devrient, a German printer.

In 1999 the 50 leva fully arrived at the world society norm of individual-postmaterialism—and even offered a mild dose of feminism (see Fig. 6). The front features the poet Pencho Slaveikov, who introduced Western literature to Bulgaria in the latter half of the 19th century. The back features another poet, Mara Belcheva, who was also Slaveikov’s lover. This note thus also reflects the international norm of featuring female cultural contributors on banknotes, although the 50 leva is no picture of gender equality: Belcheva’s image is notably smaller and less well-defined than Slaveikov’s. She also has to share space with an illustration of a bird taken from one of Slaveikov’s books. Nevertheless, if we consider the overall historical trajectory, the status of women on the 50 leva has clearly come a long way. Importantly, this note was printed in-house at the BNB Printing Works in Sofia (see Fig. 6).

In sum, the story of the 50 leva note shows how strong an influence world society norms have had over the banknotes of a country as geographically, economically, and civilizationally distant from the West as Bulgaria. The case study of the Bulgarian 50 leva note also reveals a key mechanism for the production of this isomorphism: the longstanding Central/East European practice of outsourcing banknote production to one or another of the handful of major printing houses located in powerful states—notably the US, Britain, and Germany, and for a time Russia. Clearly, these printing houses are important nodes for the international diffusion of iconographic trends. Does the centrality of Western printing houses in the banknote business imply that the iconographic diffusion from West to East has been coercive, as opposed to normative or mimetic (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)? Not necessarily; for as the Bulgarian 50 leva story also indicates, even when printing their own banknotes in-house central banks pay close attention to world society norms. More in-depth research is needed on this point.
Differences among Central/East European currencies after 1989

So far, the focus of this article has been on comparing Western versus Central/East European trends. But it is also interesting to ask, are there any significant iconographic differences among the different Central/Eastern currencies? In fact there is considerable variation in the degree to which these currencies have joined the individual and postmaterialist trend. (Note that there has been considerable variation among the West European currencies as well.) So, which Central/East European states can be said to be the iconographic leaders or laggards of the region?

One way of measuring different currencies’ level of adoption of world society norms since 1990 is to consider the relative number of banknotes featuring iconography at the two extremes: on the one hand, state-traditionalist or state-materialist figures—the most “conservative” iconographic statement, in the sense that such figures were the dominant symbolism of the early 20th century—and on the other hand, individual and postmaterialist figures—the most “progressive” iconographic statement, in the sense that they are the farthest removed from the kind of symbolism that was dominant in the early 20th century. Admittedly this method ignores banknotes with more mixed messages, but actually it captures the vast majority of banknotes issued since 1990. Table 6 reports on the results, as well as on how many human figures were used and not used in this calculation.

Table 6 indicates three rough groups within the Central/East European region. The first group, including Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and Slovenia, has offered a strongly progressive banknote iconography since 1990 (though Latvia’s placement here is tentative, as the score is based on very few human images). The second group, including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Lithuania, has offered a rough balance of progressive and conservative choices since 1990. Finally, the third “group,” including Hungary alone, has offered a strongly conservative iconography. Due to Hungary’s very high score, the mean ratio for the whole set of countries is 1.83, but only Hungary is above the mean.

What might explain this pattern? It has a very low correlation with the countries’ level of economic development, as an Inglehart modernization hypothesis might presume. By contrast, it can largely be explained with two variables that are intimately related to the world society norms perspective, as well as being quite intuitive. First, states’ need for international recognition seems to matter. This need is especially acute in the case of breakaway republics whose status in the international system could be contested. And indeed, three of the four most progressive cases in this data set—Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia—are breakaway republics. Second, geographical proximity to the West seems to matter. Estonia and Latvia are on the Baltic Sea and have been tightly linked to their neighbors in the Nordic community for many years, even becoming full members in the Nordic Investment Bank in 2005. Meanwhile, Slovenia is on the Adriatic Sea, shares borders with Austria and Italy, and thanks to the unique policies of Tito’s Yugoslavia actually had intense relations with the West since the 1960s (Lampe, 2000). Given the location of these states and their

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>(# Human figures used, # not used in calculating ratio)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>(2, 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>(23, 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>(21, 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>(29, 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>(14, 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>(17, 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>(33, 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>(29, 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>(59, 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>(24, 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>(25.1, 5.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B.: the lower the ratio, the more progressive the iconography.
close relations with their Western neighbors, it is not surprising that these states have more quickly converged on Western norms than the others.

On the other hand, the need for recognition and West-proximate geography do not help to explain Lithuania’s relatively high score, Romania’s very low score, or Hungary’s exceedingly high score. These three cases require a closer look.

Lithuania’s relatively high score in Table 5 is actually a mere artifact of the coding rules. Lithuania’s apparent conservatism stems from the appearance on all of its banknotes of its state emblem of the White Knight, which because it is a human figure gets picked up in the coding rules as a state-materialist image. In fact, it is not uncommon for state emblems to appear on post-Communist states’ banknotes, but among the 10 Central/Eastern states only Lithuania’s happens to feature a human figure. If we set aside the state emblem, Lithuania’s Table 5 score plummets to 0.41, a highly progressive score, and the puzzle of Lithuanian iconographic “conservatism” goes away.

Second, the fact that the Romanian leu shows up as an iconographic leader in the region is not anticipated by either an acute need for recognition—Romania is the longest continuously independent state in the entire region—or by West-proximate geography. So what might explain this case? It was previously noted that Romania has long nursed a geography-defying “Western” identity that stresses its heritage as a colony of ancient Rome (Boia, 2001). This strong Western orientation was already evident on Romanian banknotes of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Therefore, it is no surprise that today, Romanian banknotes are among the most progressive in the Central/East European region.

Finally, on the opposite end of the scale, why has Hungary’s post-1989 banknote iconography been so conservative? Before 1989 Communist Hungary had already been placing individual and post-materialist figures on its banknotes for decades. Yet on Hungarian banknotes since the end of Communism, out of the many human figures depicted, only two have been individual and post-materialist—and even those two exceptions came in the very early days of the new regime and were soon replaced. Instead, most of the Hungarian banknotes issued since 1990 have featured historical rulers, including the medieval kings Saint István (Stephen I) and Karolóy (Charles) I, and the 17th century prince Gábor Bethlen, who is noted for fighting against the Habsburgs. There are also a number of images of a monk from a medieval illuminated manuscript. In a somewhat different key, two banknotes featuring 19th century liberal reformers, Ferenc Déak and Count István Széchenyi, have also been issued. Széchenyi is hard to code as he occupied an interestingly liminal position between science, economics and politics, but it would be a stretch to put him in the individual and postmaterialist category. All of these iconographic choices were reaffirmed in the major new banknote issue of April 2009.

In short, alone among the Central/East European states, Hungary’s banknote iconography since the end of the Cold War has rejected the world society norm of individual-postmaterialism. Why? Although a more in-depth study is necessary on this point, the uniqueness of Hungary’s banknote iconography is perhaps rendered somewhat less surprising by the broader post-Cold War pattern of Hungarian symbolic politics. Hungarian governments have been, in the sociologist Góran Therborn’s (2006) words, “more symbolically forceful than their counterparts in other countries.” A case in point is the grand 1993 public reburial of the pro-Nazi interwar strongman Admiral Miklós Horthy. National and local authorities have also taken pains to reconstruct many Horthy-era monuments to Hungary’s glorious military past (Foote, Tóth, & Árvay, 2000). Domestic politics appears to be playing an unusually central role in this case (Rajacic, 2007; Wittenberg, 2002).

Conclusion

The title of this article adds a question mark to the famous phrase originally penned for a different geographical context by the British poet Rudyard Kipling: “East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet?” In the case examined here, the idea of such an East–West dichotomy has turned out to be baseless. The basic finding of this article is that Central/East European states have historically been quick to adopt their banknote iconography in line with the trends visible on the banknotes of their Western counterparts. This pattern dates back not just two decades, but ten. Even during the Cold War division of Europe, by the end of the 1960s the postwar individual and postmaterialist evolution of Western banknote iconography was also clearly visible on the banknotes of Central/Eastern Europe. And after 1989 the isomorphism of European national banknotes became even more pronounced, right across the continent from the Atlantic to the Balkans. The findings support the Meyer world society norms hypothesis: these states have consistently used banknote iconography to communicate their embrace of transnationally legitimated values and ontologies, as a means of creating a positive national “brand” in world (and particularly European) society.

There have been iconographic leaders and laggards among the Central/East European currencies, just as there have been among the first EU 15. The world society norms perspective can actually explain much of this variation, as a consequence of the acuteness of states’ need for recognition and their geographical proximity to the West. Even with these additional refinements, the world society norms perspective admittedly cannot account for the very conservative trajectory of the Hungarian forint. Nonetheless, the fact of intra-European variation should not distract us from the striking general finding of pan-European iconographic norms on paper money, which much of the national identity literature, with its focus on domestic factors, would not expect and cannot explain.

Euro-skeptics often quote the apocryphal words of Jean Monnet: “If I were to start anew, I would start from culture.” Skeptical voices have grown even louder since the EU’s bold decision to pursue both wider and deeper integration simultaneously. The skeptics’ question is legitimate: do the member-states of the wider Europe today have sufficiently similar core values and ontological assumptions to support their extremely ambitious project of integration? It would certainly be wrong to deny the different social, economic, and geopolitical realities that separate so-called “Old” and “New” Europe. But it is equally wrong to deny the “cultural distance” and perhaps ultimately more powerful, tradition of intense normative cross-pollination between them (Pécou, 2004). The evidence of this study of banknote iconography suggests that for over a century now, Central/East European states have been serially updating their national branding in line with the changes in Western models. And it seems reasonable to surmise that states that have undergone, in tandem, the same long historical process of change in values and ontologies should be able to find ample basis for mutual understanding—if they want it.

The key word in the above paragraph, however, is “suggests.” In this article I have focused narrowly on the iconographic trends in one aspect of one type of state-produced cultural product: human figures on banknotes. Happily, as noted in the introduction other studies of European banknotes, coins, and postage stamps have inductively discovered iconographic patterns that appear to parallel this article’s findings. Indeed scholars have seen these patterns not only within the European context, but even in states as distant as Taiwan (Deans, 2005). But in addition, some of these studies have also pointed out other important patterns, for instance with respect to the representation of nature or the use of color, that my current operationalization of the Meyer and Inglehart theories does not adequately speak to.
The benefits of extending the operationalization of the theories beyond human figures in the next phase of this research are made particularly clear by Cooper’s (2008) study of currency iconography in the post-Soviet area. Cooper finds that some post-Soviet states, such as Georgia or Kyrgyzstan, have focused their banknote iconography on individual cultural contributors, while others, such as Turkmenistan, have focused instead on state rulers. However, in a third group of cases, such as Belarus and Latvia, there has obviously been an intention to avoid depicting human figures at all, instead using other sorts of images: buildings and monuments, natural scenes, or even abstract designs. Do these cases represent a decided rejection of West and Central/East European national banknote models? Or do these cases represent a progressive development beyond those models, as the euro banknotes may also do (Hymans, 2006)? These questions carry important implications for understanding what and where is “Europe.” The best way to answer them will be to combine further theoretical development with more in-depth historical research.

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Youngmin Choe, Rodney Bruce Hall, Eric Helleiner, Matthias Kaelberer, Rieko Kage, Conor O’Dwyer, Pauliina Raento, the theoretical development with more in-depth historical research. Important implications for understanding what and where is Central/East European national banknote models? Or do these cases represent a decided rejection of West and Central/East European national banknote models? Or do these cases represent a progressive development beyond those models, as the euro banknotes may also do (Hymans, 2006)?

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